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CORRESPONDENCE.
PEOPLE V. JUREK.

Aurora, Illinois, July 13th, 1917.
Messrs. Chester G. Vernier, Elmer A. Wilcox and William G. Hale.
Dear Sirs:
I have read some .of your comments upon Judicial Decisions on
Criminal Law Procedure, with interest.
The comment which challenged my attention and has provoked my
writer's rheumatism, is the one upon the setting aside of the verdict
in People v. Jurek, 115 N. E. 644, an Illinois case.
The comment is: "The absurdity of the law which makes the
juries judges of the law as well as the fact has been often commented
upon. That it is absurd is fully conceded, except by those who desire
additional loopholes for securing the acquital of those, in fact, guilty
of crime. The above decision furnishes an additional reason for
changing the law."
The law is the rule of action, commanding the people, who are
not lawyers, to do certaiii things, and commanding the same people
not to do certain things; and ignorance of the law does not excuse the
actor. This idea originated in a monarchy, and it is very strange that
it should not obtain in a republican form of government.
The law is supposed to be enacted for the people *rather than for
the lawyers. If the law is such that the people can not understand,
then it is up to some one to explain it to them.
We know that some lawyers do not understand it, and that the
supreme courts cannot explain it so that some of the lawyers can comprehend it. We know that some people have brains-who are not
lawyers, and who occupy more places on the assessment roll than the
lawyers.
Furthermore, with us, it is a government by the people for the
people, and why should the people be denied their representation in
court, where the law is executed? They can not and do not make
more mistakes than the legislatures do in enacting a law, nor the trial
court in trying a case in law.
The fundamental proposition in the enforcement of the law by
trial is, that the offender shall be tried by his peers. That is, if the
offender can not understand the law, then he shall have a trial by
his peers, who do not know any more about the law than himself.
It is up to the lawyers to explain the law in the light of the evidence,
and the law and the lawyers do not make the evidence.
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I submit that if the lawyers can not make an unintelligent law
plain to a jury, that the offender should be excused, because his crime
is a less offense than a law which can not be explained.
It is true that many. verdicts are contrary to the written law, and
contrary to the intelligence of some people, but if the wisdom of the
past were sufficient, then there would be no use for a legislature to
repeal an act in the last new moon, and before sun-up the next day.
Every offender repeals the law in his own case.
Personally, I have never represented a defendant. I have helped
to prosecute some. The fact is that we must offset imperfections with
imperfections.
Very truly yours,
(Signed) CHAS. A. LOVE.
REPLY.

The foregoing criticism of my comment upon the recent case of
People v. Jurek, is so lackin& in coherent development and so extreme
in character as to carry with it its own refutation in the mind of the
average reader; and, hence, is in and of itself scarcely entitled to a
reply. In view, however, of the brevity of my original note, I am led
to take this opportunity of elaborating slightly upon it. The critic
must admit, of course, that he can find scant support for his views
among the standard authorities, and that insofar as the rule for which
he contends is. followed at all by the courts, it is anomalous and arbitrarily limited to criminal cases. "The doctrine has obtained," says
Mr. Wigmore, "in a few jurisdictions that the jury in dealing with the
local law applicable to the case, have a legal right to repudiate the
instructions of the judge and to determine the law for themselves;
but this ill-advised doctrine, defiant of the fundamentals of law, has
only a narrow acceptance." [Wigmore, on Evidence, § 2559.]
And in Thompson on Trials [§ 2134], the following vigorous
statement is found: "The evil consequences which flow from educating juries in the idea that they are judges of the law in a sense which
places their judgment above that of the court, and which makes
decisions of the court mere incidental aids or helps to them in making
up their judgment upon the law, must be apparent upon the slightest
reflection. It was well said, in an early and leading case in Kentucky:
'If the court had no right to decide the law error, confusion, uncertainty, and licentiousness would characterize the criminal trials, and
the safety of the accused might be as much endangered as the stability
of public justice would certainly be.' ". The same author quotes Mr.
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Justice Story, as follows: "If the jury were at liberty to settle the
law for themselves, the effect would be, not only that the law itself
would be most uncertain, from the different views which juries might
take of it, but, in case of error, there would be no remedy or redress
for the injured party; for the court would not have any right to review
the law as it had been settled by the jury. Indeed, it would be almost
impracticable to ascertain what the law, as settled by the jury, actually
was. On the contrary, if the court should err in laying down the
law to the jury, there is an adequate remedy for the injured party by
a motion for a new trial or a writ of error, as the nature of the jurisdiction of the particular court may require. Every person accused,
as a criminal, has a right to be tried according to the law of the landthe fixed law of the land-and not by the law as a jury may understand it, or choose, from wantonness or ignorance or accidental
mistake to.interpret it." [U. S. v. Battiste, 2 Summ. (U. S.) 240,
243.]
A system, therefore, which leaves the determination of the law of
the case to- those who are trained to that end, i. e., the judges, not
only tends to the establishment and maintenance of a uniform, determinable ancd methodical body of law, but even accomplishes in the
largest practicable measure that which the critic himself apparently
desires, viz., the protection of the accused from wrongful punishment.
Under the procedure which history has established, and the wisdom of
experience has justified, the rights of both society and the one charged
with crime are surrounded with every reasonable safeguard. The
people are not, as our critic would have us believe, without representation in the courts. The judges, as well as jufors, are most
emphatically the representatives of the people. The innocent man
has no better friend than the upright judge clothed with a fair
measure of authority, and society no more effective champion of law
enforcement. What more can we ask?
Moreover, a system of jurisprudence which makes juries the
judges of the law must lead inevitably, if logical, to a jury-enacted
law for the specific controversy. This in turn means no established
rule for the guidance of human conduct; hence, no law in the accepted
sense. Under such a system the judicial office may well be abolished.
WLIAm

College of Law, University of Illinois.
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